reflects Fromm's description of the necrophiliac as a person whose emotional emptiness needs to be filled with constant new acquisitions, conquests, etc.]" (29).
More broadly, Kellner claims that there are important parallels between the rise of fascism in the 1930s and the rise of Trump, writing that attending one of Trump's rallies reminded him of Leni Riefenstahl's Triumph of the Will (21) and that Trump's arrival at the Republican National Convention in Cleveland followed the scenario of Hitler arriving in Nuremberg as captured in Riefenstahl's movie (45). In my view, this imaginative association is a bit puzzling: one event shows the frightful discipline of hundreds of thousands of people in thrall of their leader, but the other event shows a banal celebrity festivity beamed across the globe.
There is a difference between a spectacle in its own right and a media spectacle. At any rate, on Kellner's account, the Trump supporters display similar "anger and rage" toward the establishment as the Nazi supporters did, show similar "idolatry toward their Führer," have been similar victims of "economic deprivation, political alienation, humiliation, and a variety of hard times," and are similarly lured by "restorative nostalgia" and promises to make their country great again (21, 24) . In terms of outer personality, though, Kellner maintains that Trump resembles the buffoonish Mussolini rather than the repressed and serious .
Kellner also notes some differences between Trumpism and Nazism, such as the lack of a party apparatus behind the rise of Trump, the absence of "disciplined cadres that the Nazis used to seize and hold power," and Trump's claim that "his deal-making skills as a supercapitalist billionaire … credentials him to be the President" (22, 27) . All in all, he thinks that Trump is best described as an "authoritarian populist" or "neo-fascist" (20, 26) . Trump is a populist in that he presents himself as the "voice of the forgotten men and women," those left behind by corrupt elites (exemplified by Hillary Clinton and Goldman Sachs), and he scapegoats outsiders as a threat to the white majority. Historically, Trump was preceded by the populist Tea Party and rightwing populists such as George Wallace and Pat Buchanan (22-23). For Kellner, Trump's populism with its promise of improving the economic condition of his supporters is a sham and refuted by his exploitation of workers as well as by his lifestyle (21, 32, 33) .
Kellner concludes that Trump's political success would burden us with a malignant and aggressive leader who has nuclear weapons at his disposal, constituting "a clear and present danger to U.S. democracy and an American Nightmare … that threatens world peace and global stability" (39; see also 95).
A strength of Kellner's discussion is that he emphasizes a distinctive feature of Trumpism -the effective blending of celebrity politics and media spectacle -but a weakness is that he too quickly designates Trump's rightwing populism as a form of fascism. Great Again" involves an agenda of a return to a less regulated and more nationalist capitalism.
In short, Judis holds that the historical and political meaning of rightwing populism (as well as leftwing populism) should be situated within electoral politics rather than in seeking its negation, as is true of fascism; it is an "early warning" (157) Certainly, the logic of rightwing populism has illiberal components; it is bound to disregard the rights of minorities who do not belong to the "people," and the populist leader, once in power, may also seek to curtail the judiciary or press when these are viewed as not in line with the political aims of the "people." This threat of illiberalism is especially worrisome in a presidential system, as distinct from a parliamentary system, since it provides the elected populist with considerable executive power to pursue illiberal policies. Certainly, one should worry with
Kellner about Trump's anti-democratic personality as well as his admiration of "strongmen" (43). Trump displays hostility toward migrants, the judiciary, the "corrupt press," and he does not share the liberal notion that political power should always be contestable. Instead, he responds to his critics with aggression and contempt. Kellner's view of Trump supporters as exemplifying this "empathy wall," and to bridge it she decided to spend a considerable amount of time during a five-year period in the region of Lake Charles, Louisiana, befriending and interviewing a small group (a total of forty individuals) of Tea Party advocates, many of whom later became Trump supporters. Lake Charles is heavily polluted by petrochemical industries, and fracking has recently contributed to environmental damage and deterioration in the area. Typically, the Tea Party enthusiasts studied by Hochschild enjoy the outdoors and are painfully aware of the decline of wildlife, the odious smell in the air, and the health risks of consuming local fish. Some of them have even been forced from their homes for environmental reasons, and one person reports widespread environmentally connected cancers in his family (44). Yet, the Tea Partiers object to more environmental regulation and favor the restriction or even elimination of the EPA. More generally, Hochschild and her students found that, across the United States, the higher the risk is by county of a person being exposed to pollution the more likely the person is to think that the government overreacts to 5 Mudde discusses this gradual turn by Trump to populism in Friedman, "What is a Populist?" 6 Recent trends toward illiberalism in The United States and Western Europe are discussed in Foa and Mounk, "The Danger of Deconsolidation." It is significant to note that the trend towards illiberalism is more prevalent among young than elderly voters, while Trump was more popular among the latter. Remarkably, one in six Americans would support "army rule," while one in three would favor a strong leader who would not have "to bother the parliament and elections" (13).
environmental issues (253). Accordingly, it seems that Tea Party supporters by voting for politicians who are lax in enforcing environmental regulation are acting against their own selfinterest. To be sure, they might believe that less regulation brings jobs, but this questionable belief cannot be motivationally decisive since most of them do not work for petrochemical or fracking industries.
This points to what Hochschild calls the "great paradox": Many Tea Partiers work in small businesses or own them and, yet, vote for politicians favoring big business -they are like "the local book store owner voting for Amazon…" (10); they live in a state near the bottom of all states in terms of life expectancy, health, educational degree attainment, and personal earnings (9), and, yet, they want less federal assistance (Louisiana is disproportionally receiving more federal aid per person); and, again, they suffer disproportionally from environmental pollution and still want less governmental environmental regulation. To solve this paradox, and to bridge the "empathy wall," we must grasp the "deep story" of the white "middle" Republican right. Social Security and Medicare (as programs that are deserved through a lifetime of work), and they also display populist hostility to global financial elites. Certainly, this seems correct regarding many Trump supporters, but this does not change the assessment that the resentment of this "middle" Republican right is significantly racist, xenophobic, etc., in nature. Now Judis grants that "rightwing populist campaigns and groups have held racist or nativist or xenophobic views," but he argues that the politically more significant issue is that "their complaints point to genuine problems," such as that "unskilled immigration has tended to pull down wages and burden the public sector" (159). Judis moves here on questionable empirical grounds, and there is no indication that such "genuine problems" were in fact significant in shaping the deep story of the "middle" Republican right: their anger is about line cutters or people who are perceived to be preferentially treated above themselves, the "real Americans." Accordingly, they do not seriously consider solutions for wage depression, such as unionization and raising the minimum wage. For years, Trump played into this prejudicial anger of the Tea Partiers with his "birtherism," and then later with his claim that Mexico would pay for building a "big, beautiful
Hochschild writes: "A deep story is a feels-as-if
wall," keeping out the criminal Mexicans. As Hochschild herself notes after visiting a Trump rally, he allowed his supporters "to feel like a good moral American and to feel superior to those they considered 'other' or beneath them." Accordingly, "while economic self-interest is never
entirely absent, what I discovered was the profound importance of emotional self-interest -a Hochschild's book tells many stories of hardship and injustice inflicted on the working and middle class of Lake Charles, and responses of courage and determination, and, in this way, she brings the people closer to us and we might feel empathy for them. But it is doubtful that the deep story itself of the Tea Partiers (and later Trump voters among them) will bridge the "empathy wall," since it is a story so clearly reflecting racism, xenophobia, patriarchy, and a morally objectionable failure to examine the facts. The prejudicial anger also has led some progressives need to greatly expand their own independent media with serious reporting, countering the much more extensive and widespread rightwing media and its much greater impact on mainstream coverage. 9 Through resistance the damage inflicted by the Trump administration might be limited and even significantly undone in the future; the greatest challenge in this respect might be its denial of human-caused climate change. Trump's view on this issue alone should have kept him from office.
8 These "Trump democrats" might not be racist, but they still voted for a candidate with a clear racist agenda and, so, in support of white supremacy. For a thoughtful discussion of this issue, see Mendoza, "Lantinx." 9 See Hertsgaard, "Progressives Need to Build Their Own Media."
